US captures Maduro in 2025: why the strategy left chavismo intact for a controlled transition

The capture of Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2025, by the United States marked a pivotal moment in Venezuela’s ongoing political and military tensions. This operation, meticulously planned and executed, resulted in Maduro’s transfer to US territory, where he is slated to face trial and imprisonment. The situation draws direct comparisons to the 1980s case involving Manuel Noriega.

However, Maduro’s removal did not trigger an immediate collapse of the Chavista apparatus. Key figures of the regime remained firmly in place, demonstrating a deliberate strategy.

The continuity of power was swiftly ensured on January 5, 2025, when Delcy Rodríguez assumed the interim presidency, an act formalized by her brother, Jorge Rodríguez, who also retained his position as president of the National Assembly. This succession preserved the formal structure of the regime.

The enduring core of Chavismo’s power

Vladimir Padrino Lopéz continues to command the Bolivarian National Armed Forces, a critical pillar of the regime’s control. Diosdado Cabello, as secretary-general of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, retains oversight of police services, intelligence units, and the armed colectivos, functioning as the regime’s internal political enforcement.

This configuration highlights that the Chavista regime was not dismantled, with its core coercive elements largely intact. The primary exception was the ring of Cuban advisors who wielded significant political influence over Maduro and reportedly perished during the operation.

A strategic decision to avert chaos

There is a rational explanation for this seemingly incomplete intervention. Historically, when the United States has pursued regime change by capturing or eliminating an entire civil-military leadership, the aftermath often plunged countries into administrative chaos and severe internal conflicts. Iraq and Syria serve as prominent 21st-century examples of such outcomes.

A regime built on force instills violence as its primary method of operation. When such a regime is fully removed, lower-ranking actors vying for power often only understand these violent methods, leading to intense internal disputes over legitimacy in the ensuing power vacuum. The strategy of leaving the Chavista regime “stunned but not knocked out” aims to compel a controlled political transition.

Navigating Venezuela’s complex transition landscape

The most significant and protracted phase now commences: orchestrating a controlled political transition gradually aligning with US strategic interests, without precipitating institutional collapse or armed fragmentation within Venezuela. This process faces multiple hurdles, including US expectations for maintaining governmental structure, the profound fear among regime figures of future prosecution, and the inherent complexity of determining what follows.

Why Delcy Rodríguez is key for initial dialogue

A simple and objective logic guided the planners: remove the central leader, preserve minimal state functionality, and create space for negotiated transition. Delcy Rodríguez embodies a critical component in this initial phase due to several pragmatic advantages.

Her role helps in:
* Ensuring the continuity of state administration, keeping ministries, PDVSA, the financial system, ports, and logistical chains operational to prevent a humanitarian crisis atop a political one.
* Providing a direct political channel to the regime’s most entrenched actors, including those commanding the Armed Forces, police, and colectivos, whose cooperation is vital for any successful transition.
* Holding the power and legal authority, as interim president, to sign administrative acts and executive orders that ratify negotiations between US interests and local powers, thereby facilitating a timeline for de-escalation and potential future elections.

The strategic exclusion of opposition leadership

The immediate exclusion of figures like María Corina Machado or Edmundo González from direct transition teams is rooted in strategic pragmatism, not a disregard for their popular legitimacy. While they garner recognition and public support, they currently lack the material force necessary to lead Venezuela’s power structure.

They do not control the Armed Forces, state or municipal governance, or state logistics, meaning they cannot guarantee the containment of violence in the short term. In the initial phases of a contentious transition, these factors—the capacity to exert coercive control—outweigh popular votes, widespread support, or international recognition. This is a matter of effective power, which they currently do not possess within Venezuela.

Ideal scenarios versus pragmatic realities

An “ideal” regime change, one that avoids the profound costs of open warfare and societal reconstruction seen in places like Iraq or Syria, can be envisioned in distinct phases. The first phase involves the hegemonic actor deploying a complex system of foreign policy signals, from diplomatic envoys to unusual military mobilizations, coupled with various pressures like blockades, culminating in actions such as kinetic strikes or the capture of key figures. This demonstrates both capability and willingness to interfere, signaling that the regime’s political direction in Caracas must change.

The second phase centers on recognizing and engaging with the real power brokers—political, military, and financial actors. Negotiations prioritize those who control arms and, consequently, the monopoly of violence. Financial actors and political operators, keen to avoid chaos, also engage, seeking to secure their interests. This is where Delcy Rodríguez, coordinating with figures like Diosdado Cabello and Padrino López, becomes central. This phase gradually realigns power with US expectations, often under the implicit threat of renewed intervention or sanctions. Over time, technocrats and acceptable civilian actors, not part of the regime’s inner circle, are integrated to establish functional governance, eventually paving the way for free elections and a return to democracy.

The precarious path ahead for Venezuela

While a controlled transition moving towards free elections seems an optimal outcome, its realization faces considerable internal challenges. Months of negotiation with Delcy Rodríguez could lead to elections permitting María Corina Machado’s participation or recognizing Edmundo González’s prior electoral victory. However, planning frequently diverges from execution.

Disgruntled actors like Diosdado Cabello and Padrino Lopéz, who possess significant coercive power, could clash to assert their influence with the Rodríguez siblings, aiming to secure their positions as interlocutors with the US and minimize extradition risks. This forced realignment might yield two outcomes: a tacit agreement among Cabello, Lopéz, and the Rodríguez family to preserve their freedom through subservience to US directives while publicly maintaining a moderate revolutionary stance, or an internal crisis leading to a betrayal, with one faction handing another to the US. These actors might prioritize prolonged collaboration over a full transition, hoping that the US midterm elections in November 2026 could shift the political landscape and reduce pressure for regime change. More radically, they might attempt a coup, further escalating tensions.

US interests and the potential for a ‘new facade’

There is also a possibility that, once the regime accommodates US demands, pressure for a complete regime change might subside. US interests in Latin America have rapidly evolved, encompassing a macrostrategy of anti-access against rival powers (the Trump Corollary), specific commercial interests like privileged access to heavy oil reserves, and domestic concerns affecting US elections, such as drug trafficking and migration. These elements collectively weigh on US policy decisions.

For Venezuela, agreements facilitating US access to heavy crude, unconditional cooperation on deporting Venezuelan migrants, and public commitments to combating drug trafficking and respecting human rights could sufficiently de-escalate pressure. This pragmatic choice, prioritizing interests over moral imperatives and assessing the costs and risks of continued intervention, might allow the Chavista regime to persist under a new facade.

Uncertain future for a nation in flux

Venezuela is thus poised to enter a period of profound uncertainty as the forces orphaned by Nicolás Maduro seek to rebalance power and determine their response to US demands while preserving their autonomy. Close monitoring of developments in the coming weeks and months will be crucial. No definitive answers exist regarding Venezuela’s future path or its consequences; only expectations remain, shared by thousands of Venezuelans both within and outside the country.