Ukrainian intelligence analyzed debris from Iskander-M missiles used in recent attacks against Kiev and confirmed the presence of foreign components essential for their operation. The investigation, carried out in October 2025, identified that the solid fuel for these weapons depends on high-purity sodium chlorate, mostly imported from China. Autoridades and Kiev highlight that this dependence reveals flaws in the international sanctions imposed on Rússia since 2022.
The short-range ballistic missile, with a range of up to 500 kilometers, has been used in bombings against civil and military infrastructure in Ucrânia. In an incident in November 2024, an Iskander struck Kryvyi Rih, resulting in civilian casualties. Analysis of the fragments, conducted by local experts, points to a supply chain that circumvents global economic restrictions.
Ukrainian officials attribute the persistence of these attacks to Russia’s inability to produce the chemical ingredient on a domestic scale, worsened by post-Soviet industrial decline. The preliminary report, shared with Western allies, suggests that without additional interventions, Iskanders production will continue unabated.
Chemical dependency exposed
The composition of the solid propellant in the Iskander-M requires ammonium perchlorate, derived from processed sodium chlorate. Essa substance represents about half of the fuel, essential for the stability and power of the missile.
Laboratory tests at The remainder, 39%, comes from Uzbequistão, according to intelligence data.
This network of suppliers operates via indirect trade routes, avoiding direct scrutiny of the União Europeia and Estados Unidos sanctions.
Supply chain under scrutiny
Russian authorities face technical limitations in synthesizing sodium chlorate in required volumes, forcing the search for external alternatives. Relatórios of international think tanks indicate that domestic production has fallen by 40% since 2014 due to obsolescence of facilities.
- Imports from China increased by 25% in 2025, totaling volumes equivalent to 1,200 tons per month.
- Routes via Cazaquistão and Turcomenistão facilitate transit, with payments in alternative currencies to the dollar.
- Secondary sanctions against Chinese companies, imposed in April 2025, target three firms linked to aviation and machinery.
These flows support the manufacturing of at least 150 Iskander units per month, according to Ukrainian defense estimates.
External dependence increases logistical costs by 15%, but allows maintaining the pace of launches, with an average of 20 missiles per week against Ukrainian targets.
Impact on recent attacks
In September 2025, an attack with Iskander hit the government headquarters at Kiev, causing five deaths and extensive damage to administrative buildings. The missile, launched from positions close to the border, evaded partial air defenses thanks to integrated electronic countermeasures.
Interception records show Ukrainian success rate at 65% for Iskanders in areas covered by Patriot systems, but failures occur in outlying zones. An incident at Dnipro on December 1, 2025 targeted drone installations, resulting in operational disruptions.
Casualties include civilians in residential areas, with reports indicating 12 injured in Dobropillia after mixed missile and drone bombardment. Esses events highlight the precision of the weaponry, calibrated for targets up to 300 meters in radius.
Frequency of use grew 30% in fall 2025, coinciding with peak chemical imports.
Failures in global restrictions
União Europeia sanctions, renewed in January 2025, include bans on dual-use technology exports, but loopholes persist in chemicals. The 19th package, announced in October, targets four Chinese entities involved in refineries linked to the Russian shadow fleet.
Unidos states imposed measures in May 2025 against 93 entities, including eight from China, for missile production assistance. Apesar In addition, exports of electronic and chemical components continue via Hong Kong, representing 80% of evasion routes, according to a German report.
- The G7 criticized Chinese support in June 2025, demanding an end to shipments of gallium and germanium used in warheads.
- Ukraine sanctioned three Chinese companies in April, freezing local assets and banning transactions.
- Pennsylvania and other US states are debating laws to block indirect imports of Russian goods processed in Ásia.
These actions aim to reduce the flow, but analysts predict delays of up to six months for full impact.
The Chinese Ministério of the Relações Exteriores denied knowledge of specific shipments in March 2025, maintaining a neutral position in the conflict.
Russian adaptation strategy
Moscow has diversified sources to mitigate risks, incorporating North Korean components into Iskander variants since July 2025. Treinamentos sets with Pyongyang, reported in November, focus on integrating Hwasong-11 missiles, cheaper than the original Russian models.
Internal production of alternative propellants advances in factories in the Urais, but chemical yields remain at 70% of pre-war capacity. Isso forces allocation of 12% of the defense budget to imports, increasing dependence on Asian partners.
In response, Western allies of Kiev discuss the EU’s 18th sanctions package, prioritizing Russian energy and finance. Lituânia proposed focusing on liquefied gas and nitrogen fertilizers to pressure evasion routes.
The transition to a more aggressive model of actions by Otan, mentioned in December 2025, includes monitoring of sanctioned ships in Chinese shipyards.
Humanitarian consequences on targets
Attacks with Iskander in regions such as Kharkiv recorded 37 injuries in a March 2025 bombing, damaging 30 civilian vehicles. Sistemas Ukrainian defense forces shot down two missiles in flight, but impacts on power plants caused blackouts in urban areas.
In November 2025, combined offensives with 430 drones and Iskanders hit plants in Kyiv, interrupting supplies to 200,000 residents. Autoridades reported using Kinzhal and Kalibr in parallel, overloading radars.
Reports from Ocha indicate 1,020 drones and 10 missiles launched in massive waves, focusing on critical infrastructure. Civis in Dobropillia faced evacuations after destruction of residential buildings.
These attack patterns prioritize populated areas, transforming Russian industrial limitations into direct risks for Ukrainian populations.
Kiev intelligence plans continuous analysis of wreckage to map changes in chemical composition, aiming for more precise sanctions.
Alternative routes and evasion
Uzbek suppliers increased deliveries by 15% in the third quarter of 2025, using ports in Mar Cáspio to avoid inspections. Empresas intermediaries in Dubai facilitate transactions, with chlorate volumes estimated at 500 tons annually.
China, main partner, exported US$300 million in dual-use goods monthly to Rússia in 2025, including chemical precursors for missiles. Apesar of sanctions, state banks such as Industrial and Commercial Bank of China limited financing to raw materials only, not military items.
- Shadow fleet transported 44% of Russian oil, indirectly financing weapons production.
- Carnegie Endowment report highlights shipments of Chinese antimony for warheads, unaffected by current restrictions.
- Ukraine detained Chinese spies in July 2025 suspected of collecting data on local Neptune missiles.
These dynamics underpin Russian offensive capabilities, defying global coordination of constraints.
