A significant increase in GPS jamming and spoofing targets Golfo Pérsico and Estreito of Ormuz since late February 2026, following the first attacks by Estados Unidos and Israel against Irã. Electronic interference affects the navigation systems of commercial ships, causing positions to appear incorrect, such as at airports, dry land, or nuclear facilities. The Estreito of Especialistas point out that the tactic creates an “electronic fog” that increases the risk of collisions and complicates operations in congested waters.
Interference began to intensify on February 28, 2026, coinciding with the military escalation. Relatórios indicate that more than 1,100 ships suffered disruptions in waters of Emirados Árabes Unidos, Catar, Omã and Irã in the first 24 hours. The number rose to more than 1,650 vessels affected on March 7, representing a 55% increase in one week. Jamming blocks satellite signals, while spoofing sends false data, causing systems to display erroneous locations.
Scale of electronic interference
Interference affects both jamming, which overloads receivers with noise, and spoofing, which injects false signals. Navios appear in impossible positions, such as on land or in fictitious straight lines towards Estreito from Ormuz. Analistas note that the pattern differs from common point interference, suggesting coordinated use. The activity also affects communications and radars in some cases.
Hundreds of GNSS disruption events were recorded daily. 3 to 4 hours of average duration per incident, totaling thousands of hours of accumulated interference.
Impacts on maritime traffic
Traffic on Estreito from Ormuz fell by more than 95% in some periods, with few vessels leaving Golfo. Tankers Westerners transit with AIS turned off, operating in “dark mode”. Isso increases the risk of collisions on narrow, busy roads. Algumas companies cancel insurance or reroute ships, worsening delays in the global supply chain.
The Estreito remains essential for oil and LNG exports. The reduction affects international energy markets.
Suspicions about the origin of the interference
Military analysts strongly suspect Irã as being responsible for most of the episodes, given its proximity and the strategic reason of hindering traffic. Ferramentas of jamming are likely produced locally or obtained from suppliers such as Rússia or China. Não there is official confirmation, but the pattern coincides with Iranian threats against ships in Estreito.
The tactic serves as a shield against drones and GPS-guided missiles. “Grey zone” usage is common in conflict regions.
Risks for civil navigation
The situation is described as extremely dangerous for maritime navigation. Navios rely on GPS to avoid collisions and follow traffic separation routes. With false signals, crews resort to visual navigation or traditional methods, which is challenging in adverse conditions. Especialistas warn of vulnerabilities inherent to GNSS in electronic warfare areas.
The phenomenon is not new to the region, with intermittent records since mid-2025 and spikes during previous clashes.
Alternatives and mitigation efforts
Companies develop alternative systems to overcome exclusive dependence on GPS. Soluções include inertial navigation, terrestrial beacons, and jamming-resistant technologies. Autoridades maritime alerts issue continuous alerts for the area of Golfo Pérsico, Golfo of Omã and Estreito of Ormuz.
Maritime safety centers monitor anomalies in AIS and recommend extra precautions. The persistence of interference requires urgent adaptations in the shipping industry.
Recent evolution of incidents
Reports from March 10 indicate more than 600 disruption events in 24 hours in the operational area. Spoofing creates illusions of linear movement of ships towards Estreito, even without real displacement. The interference spreads to waters close to Emirados Árabes Unidos.
The number of interference clusters rose from 21 to 38 in the initial days of the conflict. The trend points to geographic expansion and intensity.
