Chinese firm briefly restores secure web access for sanctioned Iranian maritime entity amid U.S. warnings
A Shanghai-based cybersecurity company briefly enabled a sanctioned Iranian maritime authority to restore its secure online operations, allowing it to process vessel clearances and collect tolls in the Strait of Hormuz, despite U.S. digital restrictions. The access, provided by TrustAsia Technologies, lasted only four days before being revoked, according to global internet monitoring organizations.
This temporary restoration of web credentials for Iran’s Persian Gulf Straits Authority (PGSA) drew sharp criticism from U.S. sanctions experts, who swiftly warned the Chinese firm about potential compliance breaches and the risk of secondary sanctions for aiding an entity linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Temporary digital lifeline for sanctioned entity
The Persian Gulf Straits Authority, designated by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on May 27, had previously lost its standard web security credentials. This loss rendered its website inaccessible through conventional browsers, forcing shipping companies to utilize unencrypted connections for critical operations. The PGSA announced on August 10 that its website had been disrupted due to “the enemy’s political influence on the internet service provision systems,” a statement shared on social media.
However, by August 17, the PGSA declared the issue resolved, stating that its secure domain, https://pgsa.ir, was once again available for requests. NetBlocks CEO Alp Toker confirmed that TrustAsia Technologies, a Shanghai-based certificate authority, had issued new digital security credentials to the PGSA. This action allowed the Iranian authority to regain secure online access, effectively circumventing the digital restrictions imposed by U.S. sanctions and continuing its operations, including vetting vessels and collecting tolls in the vital Strait of Hormuz.
The technical details and security risks
The absence of standard SSL/TLS certificates meant that the PGSA website could not be accessed securely, compelling shipping firms to revert to unencrypted connections. While no specific data breaches or detrimental uses of intercepted data have been publicly reported from these insecure connections, the shift itself created a significant vulnerability. Alp Toker highlighted that this situation forced traffic into “insecure protocols,” which could make data susceptible to interception.
Toker further explained that this type of vulnerability is more prone to government exploitation rather than corporate breaches or personal data leaks. Such an environment could potentially allow authorities to monitor communications sent through the platform, possibly identifying shipping firms that collaborate with the PGSA. The primary consequence was increased difficulty in accessing the website, as most web browsers strongly advocate for secure HTTPS connections, meaning any form submissions could have been easily intercepted due to a lack of encryption during transit.
U.S. warnings and compliance implications for TrustAsia
The U.S. Treasury Department, upon designating the PGSA in May, explicitly stated that the authority “spearheads an Iranian-controlled scheme that flagrantly violates international law and U.S. sanctions.” The department issued a clear warning: “Anyone cooperating with the so-called strait authority may be providing support to and receiving services from the IRGC, which ultimately benefits from this attempted extortion, and may therefore be exposed to sanctions risk.”
Jeremy Paner, a partner at Hughes Hubbard & Reed and a U.S. sanctions expert, underscored the significant enforcement powers held by U.S. authorities over such actions. He cautioned that the U.S. possesses broad authority to impose sanctions on non-Iranian companies that provide “any sorts of services” to sanctioned Iranian entities. Paner stressed the critical nature of TrustAsia’s actions:
- The restoration of the certificate is unequivocally sanctionable under Executive Order 13224.
- This authority does not require the service to be “knowingly” provided, rendering the automated nature of the certificate issuance irrelevant to its sanctionable status.
- He urged TrustAsia to review its compliance program proactively “before it is too late.”
In a statement issued on August 20, a spokesperson for TrustAsia confirmed that the firm had issued a “Domain Validated TLS certificate for pgsa.ir,” noting that such certificates are typically issued through automated domain control validation. The firm then revoked the certificate shortly after the warnings emerged.
Broader context: sanctions and China’s digital infrastructure
TrustAsia promotes itself as a “leading and professionally certified certification authority in China,” with a mission to “Build trust everywhere in the digital world.” However, its temporary assistance to the PGSA highlights a growing divergence in global internet infrastructure and compliance. Alp Toker pointed out that while almost all major root certificate authorities conduct business with the U.S. and generally adhere to its sanctions, TrustAsia has opted for a different path.
Toker observed that TrustAsia has “gone its own way, building a China-first certificate infrastructure that sidesteps the West.” This approach enabled the firm to issue new digital security credentials to the PGSA, allowing Iran to resume collecting revenue from ships traversing the Strait of Hormuz via its secure online portal. The incident underscores the complexities of enforcing international sanctions in an increasingly fragmented digital landscape and the potential for non-Western entities to provide services that undermine such measures.






